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Beating “Love” to Death: Emotion Junkies, the Unnatural Affectations of
“Loving Earth,” and other Ghostly Infatuations
George Conesa
An ‘Ecopsychology’ Monograph
“Love loves to love love.”
~James Joyce, Ulysses

Introduction: Beating “Love” to Death
Socrates employed a built-in process of irony (so-called ‘the Socratic method’) when attempting
to draw out ultimate meaning from his frustrated interlocutors. The problem, then and today, it
seems, lies in our individual interpretation of constructs that most of us take for granted, and
particularly, asserting instead their vernacular arbitrariness. In a previous work, the author has
argued, for example, that confounding the constructs of ‘biophilia’ (‘love’), ‘self,’ ‘nature,’
‘spirituality,’ and/or ‘consciousness’ -- some of which, practically speaking, often operate as
false or empty signifiers (they are imprecise or ambiguous categories) -- might account for our
collective inefficacy in tackling major environmental challenges and problems (Conesa, 2021).
We take singular words to mean many-a-thing, grow accustomed to mostly never thinking about
their original etymologies, and then, with astounding overconfidence, make one-to-one
correspondences from their ephemeral and translucid arbitrariness to fleeting or vague feelings,
standing ipso facto, oddly enough, for the superiority of ‘a subject.’ Voila! Metaphysics
proliferate into untenable ecological ontologies.
As Socrates might have said, “An unexamined life is not worth living.” A ‘feeling’ and/or
strongly felt ‘emotion’ are the beginning, not the end of psycho-biological inquiry – of the story.
Otherwise, neither literature, nor the cinema, nor clinical psychology or psychiatry are relevant
pursuits from/with which to inform a full-fledged humanity.
More to the point, virtual demonstrations of ‘love’ have become our present-day ‘quick-anddirty’ epistolary. From having one email account, some folks have gone to maintaining a virtual
presence across multiple social media platforms and in some instances to maintaining several
accounts of each! On one social media account, a person might ponder about the unfairness of
love or might chastise a particular lover. On another, a meme-marquee goes on about the
capriciousness of earthly love. And the same person, on a different media platform, curates a
visual jungle of snapshots where they present themselves happy as hell and bathed in
inexhaustible and unmeasurable bliss (Tromholt, 2016; Grieve, March, & Watkinson, 2020).
What is one to do with all these outpourings of emotion?
It is also very common, as an aspect of hyper-emotionalism or new age pamphletism, for
example, to find amalgamations of inchoate infatuation and other juvenile forms of
emotionalism, including romantic love, with aspects of the natural world, further romanticized
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with the possible existence of an actual ‘mother Earth.1 When these and many other concoctions
of ‘love’ or ‘loving’ come under critical scrutiny (refer to Bode and Kushnick in this issue), a
real overlap between characterizations of romantic love, for example, and aspects of addiction
become clear. ‘Love’ can also be propagandized as virtue signalling leading to affective
polarization (see below).
In short, it seems as impossible (unreal, misguided) to love the deceased singer Elvis (the totality
of who this person was when he was alive) as it is to love an entire planet (the totality of Earth
processes requiring extensive scientific training and experimentation). Euphemisms for the
phrase ‘loving Earth’ abound and so do explications solely in terms of ‘feelings,’ or about what
‘connection’ could mean for that individual or for several individuals over their lifespans.
And that is the recurring challenge: What do people mean, precisely, when they use the word
‘love’? What feelings and other cognitive processes occur when a very generic word (an empty
signifier) supplants any number of, and often confounded, ideas? A closer look at what
characterizes love,’ in medical terms, is underway and explained by the effects that some fungi
have on human behavior (psychology). Anthropologist Peter Frost observes the following
(personal communication; 2020: 598-599):
Different social environments may have thus favored different pathogenic strategies for
manipulation of human behavior. For example, in hunter-gatherer societies, a pathogen may
pursue a strategy of creating gifted individuals—shamans—who, as community healers, can
spread it to other community members. In tropical horticultural societies, a pathogen may pursue
a strategy of increasing its transmission from one household to another via sexual relations.

The implications of this type of inquiry are manifold and very relevant to an analysis of what
motivates strong emotional declarations and behaviors when folks profess ‘love’ for one another,
non-human animals, inanimate objects, or abstractions – ‘Mother Earth.’
Quizzically, folks who might be interested or invested in ingesting fungal psychedelics or believe
in new age theories about transcendental fungi neurogenesis would discount (a case of ‘cherry
picking’) the notion that many species of Candida could diminish their agentic possibilities in
questions of ‘love.’ Or the very same miconauts might end up making illogical declarations (a
case of cognitive dissonance) such as “Okay, if so, then Candida knows best.” Indeed, tell that to
the desiccated zombie ant whose body has just exploded releasing hundreds of Cordyceps spores.
Lest we forget, this is ‘nature connection’ at its raw-best (Brignoli, 2019).
Apropos, the handful of studies that specifically look at the relationship between the use of
psychedelics and a potential increase in nature relatedness are difficult to interpret (Lyons, &
Carhart-Harris, 2018; Kettner, et al., 2019). The reason for this may be that the construct nature
relatedness is ill-defined; in some cases, the subjects themselves might not be neuro-typical, or
little is known about the sort of experiences these subjects had before the studies were
conducted, making it likely that the only notion about ‘nature-connection’ that emerged, did so
1

Invariably, at times, these homeopathically diluted forms of worshipping lead to, by irrational-superstitious causeeffect malabarism, some notion of ‘spirituality’ -- and yes, equally juxtaposed with esoteric and quite unprovable
ideas about ‘consciousness expansion.’
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artificially as part of the study. In one study, a poke in the eye of easy notions of shamanism,
there was no association between the use of psychedelics and a desire to help animals (Pöllänen,
Osika, Stenfors, & Simonsson, 2022).
Ironically, even if positive results abounded in the literature, it would be quite the sad story that
one could not ‘relate to nature’ (i.e., ‘love nature’) unless sufficiently chemically disturbed (or,
unless one is female and from an indigenous group, or born before the Industrial Revolution,
etc.,).
‘Love’: A Working Definition
For the purposes of this monograph, the author shall fall back on Albert Ellis’s definition of love,
which is general enough to accommodate the many sentiments, feelings, and strong emotions
which characterize ‘it’ (1985:32), from neuro-typical cases to its dysfunctional aberrations:
Any kind of more or less intense emotional attraction to or involvement with another. It includes
many types and degrees of affection, such as conjugal love, parental love, familial love, religious
love, love of humanity, love of animals, love of things, self-love, sexual love, obsessivecompulsive love, etc. (Ellis, 1954, p.l17) Some of the many appropriate synonyms for love-and
especially for healthy love-are: fondness, liking, regard, esteem, closeness, intimacy, friendship,
caring, concern, tenderness, kindliness, and ardor.

Ellis himself admitted to the challenge of defining ‘love’ as when he wrote (1985:32): “What is
love? It is a feeling that is so varied and pervasive that it is hard to define.” However, there is
enough in the above definition and his concerns about, in particular, “romance” (“Devotees of
romance tend to create and maintain a number of irrational beliefs (iBs) or myths that interfere
with intimate …”), that can be applied to even many more complex and diverse conjugations of
‘love.’ A closer look at ‘self-nature’ intimations reveals that its excepting as a purer form of
human development and expression might instead reveal all sorts of mixed types of ‘love,’
including a projection or a need for ‘self-love,’ the sexualization of ‘nature,’ and/or obsessivecompulsive attachments toward non-human animals and things.
Alas, no Platonic (‘canonical’) perfect-singular ‘love,’ ‘nature,’ or ‘self’ exists.2
‘Ecopsychological’ Deontology
Much of what is presented as environmental philosophy, deep ecology, and even
‘ecopsychology,’ takes the form of deontological ethics, the do’s and don’t’s of human<>human,
human animal<>non-human animals, or human<>nature relations. However, as in other forms of
deontological arguments, these stances are not always or necessarily logically consistent nor
have pragmatic value to the extent that their deontology is based on idiosyncratic, ego-centric,
and/or anthropocentric ontologies (arbitrary). As Albert Camus observed in The Rebel (1956:
302-303), reformers end up establishing even more draconian systems once in power due to
humanity’s never-ending quest for the ineffable quality “unity,” which often disguises itself as
‘love’:
Instead, the author reiterates the reality of ‘many selves’ (moment-to-moment and throughout the lifespan)
interpreting ‘many natures’ as seen in Figure 3 and shared in “Ecopsychology Revisited” (2019):
https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=monographs
2
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Life is this dichotomy itself, the mind soaring over volcanoes, of light, the madness of justice, the
extenuating intransigence of moderation … Man can master in himself everything that should be
mastered. He should rectify in creation everything that can be rectified. And after he has done so,
children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society … There is an evil, undoubtedly, which
men accumulate in their frantic desire for unity.

According to Camus, some degree of foresight toward moderation makes for more acceptable
forms of rebellion. Oftentimes, conversations about devotional investment (‘love’) in ideas or
feelings of ‘self’ in ‘connection’ with ‘nature,’ the latter often mischaracterized or singularized
as a breathing-living entity, elude self-criticism (moderation). A critically moderated,
‘ecopsychology’ might proceed as follows:
1) To inquire further into the degree to which professionals, itinerant participants, and
clients infuse or project their own psychological shortcomings and aspirational needs
onto natural processes – to clarify what the constructs ‘nature’ and ‘connection’ mean.
2) To tease out constructs that are often bundled together in quizzical causal and casual
fashion, like in supposing that a certain feeling, at a certain time or place, justifies an
esoteric and tangled weaving of, say, ‘consciousness,’ ‘love,’ ‘spirituality,’ and
‘something else,’ idiosyncratically interpreted by a given individual – again, clarify
constructs.
3) To continue the necessary work of serious interdisciplinary consilience that some
‘ecopsychological’ approaches have lacked and continue to lack to the extent that these
often oversell either generic and confusing notions, or anomalous interpretations of
eastern and/or native American religions entangled with pseudo-scientific claims (i.e.,
pseudo-profound bullshit)3, a serious issue if research university groups are themselves
contributing to esoterism -- confusing constructs.
Self-criticism (Camus’s “moderation”) is most warranted today when media misinformation is
rampant. Most academics, teachers, students, and democratically-oriented thinkers are, at this
moment, in various states of dismay -- very distraught -- by pernicious cultural trends, by the
missing democratic fundamentals of civility, tolerance, reasoned judgement, and do-as-littleharm-as-possible pragmatism. Progress toward common sense goals of pursuing a valuable and
fact-based education, undoing the damages that humans have inflicted upon our planet, and
seeking sustainable solutions that address thoughtless or arbitrarily conceived exploitative
enterprises, seems to have, if not stalled at a perilous crossroads in the history of our species and
planet, at least been challenged in ways that make most honest efforts nugatory.
It serves no purpose to add to the unclarity and incoherence of our times yet more fanciful tales
whose only purpose seems to arouse people into “lock-stock-and-barrel” ideological positions
and emotional states which might operate as virtue signalling, and might lead to affective
polarization and culture cancelling for, it seems, self-serving or ignorant reasons. A great degree

3

Gordon, P., Cheyne, J.A., Barr, N., Koehler, D.J., & Fugelsang, J.A. (2015). On the reception and detection of
pseudo-profound bullshit. Judgement and Decision Making, 10(6), 549-563.
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of intellectual skepticism and modesty, frugality, temperance, and resilience are needed to offset
the rampant and aimless consumerist excesses which have for too long become the norm.
Emotion Junkies
Past and more recent political events, particularly of the conspiracy kind, are proof that humans
relish experiencing even psychologically corrosive emotions as part of identification and tribal
belongingness processes (Lexhagen, Lundberg, & Chekalina, 2020). Emotions burst out and
blend in from activity to activity, making clear causal connections quite difficult: Do I overeat
because I am in love or because I was just dumped by my lover, who also ate for confusing
reasons? Did eating this delicious meal on an alpine meadow and falling in love, simultaneously,
precipitate a profound feeling of ‘nature connection’? Most likely, yes, “all of the above.”
The particular case of relishing noxious emotions (e.g., high arousal with anger) seems to adhere
to models which also describe addictive behaviors (Christensen, 2017). That is, the human
reward system operates via a complex interplay of paleo-mammalian and neocortical neuronal
circuitry that, at times, is apt to confuse the subjective agent and could explain addictive
behaviors, as described by Christensen (2017:4):
The human reward system evolved to respond to natural rewards (rewards we find in nature;
foods like meat, vegetables, crops, sex, shelter, etc.). These contain a deeper ‘meaning’ to human
psychobiological health: the nutrients of food, the shelter before the cold, reproduction for sex,
etc. The reward system does not differentiate between natural and artificial rewards … In the
addicted brain, pleasure is experienced, but no satiety, because no actual biochemical imbalance
is re-established. This continuous pleasure stimulation over time induces the amygdala to be
hyper-activated, while the insula is hypo-activated. This is the basis of the problematic and
inadequate decision-making of addicted individuals: they have little access to the top-down
regulatory control processes acquired through socialization mediated by frontal and prefrontal
networks, which would help signaling the long-term implications of different choice options.

As reported elsewhere (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015), cognitive executive functions,
including our habitual use of analytical thinking in order to better assess the context and nature
of our emotional lives, requires training and conscious diligence (“An unexamined life is not
worth living.”). At the extreme end of thinking are the ineffectual and even dangerous effects of
addiction. Again, quoting Christensen (2017:4), “… [addicts] have little access to the top-down
regulatory control processes acquired through socialization mediated by frontal and prefrontal
networks, which would help signaling the long-term implications of different choice options.”
But what might one say about strongly felt emotions that seem to be part of social norms?
During a visit to Spain, and while staying with friends, there was a very strange moment (for an
unprepared American) where their family members reunited: grandparents, parents, children, and
grandchildren. At some point, in an abrupt, strident and hysterical fashion, one of the grandkids
asked their grandmother to confirm that she (the eldest) was her favorite child – that she was
loved the most. In unison some of the others, including adults, asked the same question, making
the poor grandmother and visitors feel quite uncomfortable. The poor woman finally said, “I love
you all equally” (“Los quiero a todos igual”). The almost narcissistic necessity to vie for
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attention as ‘love,’ or establish some birth order pecking hierarchy as ‘love,’ seemed quite
medieval – immature for sure.
During the same visit, aunts kept repeating to various (favorite) nephews, in a strident and
hysterical manner, different versions of “I love you too much,” “I love you so much that I could
eat you,” or “Don’t forget that I am your favorite aunt!” (Bajoghli, et al., 2014) Frank Sulloway
would have had a field day analyzing and following through with these declarations as indicators
of birth order effects and their products: undeserved favoritism, personal vendettas and social
unrest (Sulloway, 1997).
Birth order effects and their medieval consequences to self and society aside, it is an empirical
question whether this emotional amplification and familial pedigree sorting itself produces
emotion junkies who go on to enable their descendants in iterations of many types of
psychological insecurities. If so, it is the sort of transgenerational affective disorder that keeps on
chipping away at full-fledged agency.
Virtue Signalling (Moral Grandstanding) and Affective Polarization
The examples shared above suggest that many declarations of ‘love’ fall into the category of
virtue signalling (moral grandstanding) and can lead to situations of affective polarization (Hill
& Garner, 2021). Almost any human thought, emotion, or act can be said to be ‘virtuous’ if a
given culture deems it so. Obviously, not every product of ‘love’ or ‘loving’ results in actions
that are consistent with even its western European agreed upon descriptions or ideals – are
virtuous. Also, that consensus changes over time. Additionally, cross-cultural notions of ‘love’
vary even more widely. It is the ‘devotional’ aspect of ‘love’ which could be (has been)
misconstrued as virtue. When a person claims that “they love Jesus” (or The Buddha), for
example, they might be also virtue signalling to the extent that they deem this relationship to be
‘sacred’ and superior in some form – more virtuous than other types of relationships. Any other
person who fails to declare the same, by default, must be less virtuous, even blasphemous. Virtue
signalling is intrinsic to human societies to the extent that norms determine conduct, and
feedback on ideal behaviors keeps folks on “the right path.” In a biosemiotic sense, meaning,
valuing, and evaluating are inescapable of life:
… natural systems are intrinsically evaluative from within precisely because signification occurs
at all levels … The stronger biosemiotic argument asserts that because meaning and signification
are widespread in the natural world, all creatures are relative evaluators with respect to their
umwelten and each other (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006: 26).

Circling back to Spanish grandmothers and syrupy loving aunties: Is the necessity to monopolize
‘grandma’s love’ a form of virtue signalling to the extent that she might be seen as sage-like in
the family’s eyes? By association, if grandma ‘loves me best, I must also be virtuous’ – even the
most virtuous! If three aunties compete with each other with their hyperbolic expressions of
‘love’ and ‘loving,’ are they also virtue signalling and, to boot, engaging in affective
polarization? Playing favorite may be as old as human societies, but its advertisement, 24/7 while
employing multiple platforms of social media, is a more recent phenomenon.
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Affective polarization comes into play when competing ideologies of which sage is ‘truer’
delineate imaginary and actual battlefields. According to Hill and Garner (2021:14834):
We are worried about affective polarization—the phenomenon whereby partisans on opposing
sides come to view one another more negatively.
No human society is composed of an ideologically homogeneous population. Or to put it
otherwise, human societies require people who disagree to cooperate and trust each other. They
must also allow for disagreement and productive discussion of competing views. Yet, virtue
signalling undermines all of this.
On the one hand, we saw that virtue signalling seems to prevail in contexts where conformism is
rewarded. Yet, a serious discussion about difficult moral questions is not helped by an
environment that punishes dissent or rewards hyperbole for the sake of homogeneity. We strongly
encourage the reader to consider how a need to constantly signal that one was a good Marxist and
the corollary fear of being denounced affected the quality of moral and scientific debate. We
would suggest that growing worry, occasionally expressed by academics in the popular press,
about the increasingly difficult task of debating certain issues is in part a product of virtue
signalling and the context it creates.
On the other hand, phenomena like affective polarization generate resentment and anger between
fellow citizens. Rather than treating fellow citizens as partners in search of good ideas and
policies for the nation, one starts to view others as obstacles or enemies.

And now we come to address the mammoth in the room with interconnected questions: Is the
person who says ‘I love the Earth’ an emotion junky? Is that person also virtue signalling and
possibly contributing to affective polarization? Put another way, is the person who feels as
though a sunset ‘spoke to her’ personally an emotion junky, virtual signalling, and potentially,
starting on the path of affective polarization? Can we tell on the surface, whether this person is
speaking metaphorically or literally?
These are not trivial questions to the extent that some ecofeminists (Cuomo, 1992), for example,
have in the past axiomatically confounded privileging a particular sex with an exalted view of
‘love’ or ‘loving,’ and by extension engaged in virtue signalling, implying, also, superiority
statements that logically led to affective polarization.4 The mainstream cultural pushback to these
types of moral grandstanding, worldwide, results in even more radical forms of affective
polarization operating in a never ending vicious (uncivil) positive feedback loops.5
Now to the whole herd of mammoths: Is a purely humanistic ‘ecopsychology’ (egocentric,
anthropocentric, idiosyncratic, and uncritical) – as opposed to posthumanistic – condemned to
confuse (confound) a complex and in some cases unknowable multifactorial ‘nature’ (natural
processes) with personal ‘feelings’? If so, how does this translate in the ambit of ‘healer’ –
4

Is it surprising, then, that some American males, to name one sex and country, retaliate with admixtures of vitriol
and despondency?
5
This is a different issue than the rights of individuals or groups to address and correct injustices past and present.
However unjust or wrong, it does not help anybody’s cause to privilege any sex, or bramble strange notions of ‘self’
with even stranger ideas of ‘nature.’ (See Wernitznig, 2021, in this Journal – Vol. 3(1), Article # 6)
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patient relations, or for that matter, anytime any person makes a declaration about ‘nature’
intending to impress or teach eager devotees?
The Unnatural Affectations of Loving “Earth”
The way philosophers, computer scientists and semioticians might go about elucidating and
predicting the consequences of believing ‘P’ could help us track the intricacy of “relations”
given certain, known parameters. The exacting work of Kurt Lewin, more precisely his
topological force-fields dynamics work (1936), can be taken to be one of several foundational
antecedents of applied psychology.
One way to track important features of, let’s call it, the epistemological background of a certain
thinker and speaker who also makes affect declarations about ‘her relationship’ to or ‘her
connection’ with ‘nature,’ is to first assess what sort of reasoner they are. One would be inclined
to do so, if for no other reason than to save time later on during a conversation and to cut to the
proverbial chase when it comes to the more relevant points. As Socrates found himself, it is the
case that a person, a reasoner, may not even be aware from whence their thoughts come. Figure 1
employs the diagrammatic analysis of semiotic squares with which to contrast four different
types of reasoners (please refer to the work of Dormandy in this issue for a full explication of
doxastic logic applied to various ideas of ‘love’).
Without calling it ‘ecopsychology,’ one can find even professors of ‘nature connectedness’ who
are quite happy to hold onto such vague phrases in order to, one imagines, attract impressionable
students. For example, at the University of Derby, UK, there exists a “nature connectedness
research group,” their slogan: “Our nature connections research aims to understand people’s
sense of their relationship with the natural world. We create everyday interventions in order to
improve this relationship for the wellbeing of humans and nature. Our research is good for
nature and it is good for you. Let nature be your story … Our story is nature.” Self-assured but
without providing an iota of construct analysis or validity, they declare: “Nature connectedness
captures that relationship between people and the rest of nature. Nature connectedness is a
measurable psychological construct that moves beyond contact with nature to an individual’s
sense of their relationship with the natural world.” Is that truly so? The statements assume that
the variables ‘nature’ and ‘connectedness’ have been clearly defined and can be manipulated.
Figures 2 and 3 would be familiar to computer scientists (computer modeling): Entity
Relationship Diagrams (ERD). Figure 2 is an example of basic and selected attributes that could
be assigned to two ‘agents’ who differ in three attributes each and their degrees of agentic
freedom, while also interacting with each other (“R”). Figure 3 fleshes out these relationships so
that one can better judge the value of their respective contributions toward an as-accuratedescription-of-reality-as-possible. Clearly, Entities (agents) A and B are perceiving and living
very different realities and their relationship (R) is affected by their unique perspectives. “N”
signifies their relationship to ‘nature,” however each agent comes to define ‘it.’ Depending on
how disjointed their respective realities happen to be, efforts to establish common ground,
outside a few practical activities, might be incommensurable (Conesa, 2020). Figures 2 and 3 do
not take into account how the passage of time affects attributes or relations, short or longer term,
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however, originators of ERD modeling later revised their constructs to account for these early
shortcomings (Chen, 1976; 2006).
An example: Entity/Agent A, a forester, might believe in and practice controlled burning in order
to reinvigorate forests and provide food resources for fauna, based on scientific evidence,
whereas Entity/Agent B may feel that burning even one tree is the cruelest of acts, because trees
‘feel’ like people do, or so they believe. In semiotic terms (Semantics, Syntactics, Pragmatics …)
meaning relations between agents A and B lead to any number of interactive situations (Rα X
Rβ; Rα + Rβ; Rα < Rβ; or Rα > Rβ) with agonist and antagonist results. (Refer to caption for
Figure 3.) The actual range of all probable relationship states is vast to the extent that both
agentic attributes and circumstances vary, themselves and also across time, thus making simple
‘self-nature’ statements provisionary at best (José Ortega y Gasset’s famous observation: “Yo soy
yo, y mis circunstancias,” “I am I and my circumstance.”)
Despite the fact that Entity/Agent A enters in a communicative relationship with Entity/Agent B
and ‘nature’ from an ‘eyes wide open’ perspective, and Entity/Agent B might come to the same
relationship, for lack of a better term, from an unnatural affectation of loving “Earth.” To be
fair, both could accomplish a set of similar ends: they can both plant trees, recycle, named their
children Sequoia, and raise goats for milk and cheese without killing them for meat.
Figure 3 represents a fairly typical dynamics, as inferred from present day political tensions in
the Unites Sates between groups of agents who have different educational backgrounds, belief
systems, or thinking and emotional dispositions. Both groups might engage, equally, in virtue
signalling.6 But there exists also true malevolence of the kind we are witnessing at the moment
of this writing, when one nation invades another, cruelly kills or tortures peaceful people, and
systematically increases pollution out of personal vanity or sadistic satisfaction. Malevolence
also includes the intentional and long-term destruction of entire ecologies for profit. The
catastrophically swift or incremental results of malevolence act as social catalysts for events
much worse to come, or so it seems at the moment.
Finally, some form or another of the above relationships (points of congruence and
disagreements) are part of integral ecology communication and moderator models employed,
oftentimes, in order to identify the various motivations represented in divergent interlocutors
(Esbjorn-Hargens & Zimmerman, 2011). To those of us who have participated in these sessions,
it is quite discouraging, but not all that surprising, that extreme ideology and tribal identification,
more often than not, win the day. Most participants go home as grumpy as, ever each holding
onto their preferred bag of colored marbles. “We did our best,” say the Hatfields and the
McCoys.
A Perambulation: Other Ghostly Infatuations
It is anybody’s guess what the many prehistoric symbols found deep in caves or cliffs might
mean exactly, without asking the original artist. Their circles, spirals, and crosses, as far as we
know, may be akin to ‘hugs and kisses’ that are today bestowed in virtual emoji simplifications
6

… leading to affective polarization and ‘cancel culture.’
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and representations of planet Earth, the icons themselves anthropomorphized as returning their
love. These archaic psychological vestiges might follow the meme rule and heuristic “no harm,
no foul.” In other words, iconizing our existence in terms of a preferred identity and guessing or
establishing a relation to the natural world is likely to be an archaic psychological vestige, too
irresistible not to continue exploring without detrimentally affecting other means of ‘knowing.’
They are ghostly infatuations in the sense that we encounter these symbols in deep caves and
cliff walls as apparitions and with little cultural context to make them fully explicable; and they
do affect us so. One supposes, also, that there is an element of sympathetic magic or concordance
to the extent that that which the seer cannot fully explain but only feels, deeply and ephemerally,
matches an equally obscure ochre-drawn spiral, aloft midway between the muddy cave floor and
shiny stalactites.
Both open-ended projective opportunities and top-down perception prove to be irresistible if not
inescapable. Seeing ghostly figures in clouds, scary goblins and dancing fairies behind bushes, or
hearing ghosts chattering in the dark, are cases of pareidolia running amok, as visual or auditory
stimuli, past and present (Maranhão-Filho, & Vincent, 2009; Liu, et al., 2014; Ness & Phillips,
2014; Kato & Mugitani, 2015; Mulroy et al., 2019; Mavrogiorgou, et al., 2021). Face-like forms
are easily seen because our perceptual system evolved to resolve actual, real potential friends or
foes. One can conjure any sort of universal and personal meaning as in seeing a Jesus-look-alike
shape on a piece of toast (Liu et al., 2014) or a fairy-like image appearing above the water falls.
From here on, basic perception and top-down processes can easily turn into magical thinking.
Apropos, magical thinking endures, to this day, even in the most unlikely places, to the point that
even some academicians are not at all shy about declaring themselves followers of Amazonian
shamans or members of a pagan society. Popular shows have proliferated that exploit the idea of,
more than explore, natural magic while resorting to perpetuating talismanic adoration of known
and newfound sigils.
Conclusion
In other works (2020, 2021) the author has argued that confusing notions of ‘self’ and ‘nature,’
for example, describing the former solely (arbitrarily) in terms of affect, or the latter as a singular
sentient being, actually diminishes a wider and more inclusive range of ‘connection’ possibilities
– it is more revealing of the person who “feels that way” than it is of the true diversity of selves
or natures. A more honest and exacting description of the ‘self” was evident in Santiago Ramón
y Cajal’s observations, ninety years ago. Quoting Cajal, Benjamin Ehrlich (2022:312) writes:
Believing that a representation is the self is like thinking that a photographic lens depicts itself.
Maybe if there were a mirror in front. But in man the self has no mirror. The self is absolutely
inaccessible. That which we take for a mirror, consciousness, only show us the product of the
selection […] thought to be the object but what is thought to be the object is not what we think,
but rather yet another image about which one thinks.

Rather stubbornly, and mostly without evidence, generations since have been bent on dressing up
‘the self’ as many-a-thing, proving Cajal’s point. In this sense to claim that “self is love” is
another ghostly affectation. (See also Dennett, 1991.)
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If the sentiment, or more precisely, an emotion that one identifies as ‘love’ becomes the
protagonist of and footnote to almost everything we do, that is, if that thing ‘love’ reigns
supreme and is definitive of what most humans do or want, then grinding and packing everything
else into the same ‘love’ sausage casing becomes commonplace if only to add provenance to ‘our
feelings’ – in order to, unnecessarily perhaps, validate them.
As James Joyce declared in Ulysses, “Love loves to love love.” In the context of this text, the
sentence is understood to be a fitting description of emotion addiction (‘the emotion junky’).
However, so stumping about and stamping every other ‘self-nature’ association as inevitably a
thing of love, or for love, runs the risk of rendering every such feeling, whatever it might have
been, shallow or circumspect. When we beat ‘love’ to death (virtual signalling) it is more likely,
it seems, that we are in the shadows of its scarcity. In its clamoring we know it is a thing lost to
us that, perhaps, could be if only one recited the right incantation holding one’s mouth right.
֍

֍

֍
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Figure 1: Semiotic squares applied to doxastic logic. Four potentially antagonistic reasoning
modalities are contrasted.
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Figure 2: An unlabeled (unassigned) example of an Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) to be
fully used in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) depicting the communicative dynamics between
two types of reasoners, comparing their educational backgrounds and cognitive biases. The
relationship nexus “R” and “N” includes both interpersonal dynamics between entities/agents A
and B (“R” without “N”), their relational status to their ideas of ‘nature’ (“N” without “R”), and
their overlap (“R” juxtaposed with “N”). Again, in semiotic terms (Semantics, Syntactics,
Pragmatics …), meaning relations between agents A and B, lead to any number of potential
interactive situations (Rα X Rβ; Rα + Rβ; Rα < Rβ; or Rα > Rβ …) with both agonist and
antagonist results. For example, both entities/agents happen to interact while problem solving on
an issue specific to their beliefs about “N” (Rα X Rβ). Under some circumstances, Entity/Agent
A could affect and change specific attributes, agentic situations, or relationship status of
Entity/Agent B. This ERD diagram is simplified to the extent that the factor time (t) is not shown
(Chen, 2006).

“Men ought to know, that from the brain, and from the brain alone, arise our
pleasures, joys, laughter, and jests, our sorrows, pains, griefs, and tears.”
~Hippocrates

“Existence is a blind and unshakable force indifferent to feeling.”
~Giacomo Leopardi
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